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SUMMARY 
Texas ranchmen sustained heavy financial 
losses during the 1950-57 drouth. Reduced incomes 
caused a gradual depletion of their financial assets 
and borrowing for necessary production outlays 
and living expenses impaired their operating and 
investment capital. 
The records obtained from one group of ranch 
operators showed they lost 21 percent of their as-
sets, increased their liabilities 46 percent and lost 
38 percent of their net worth during the 7 drouth 
years. By early 1958, the net worth position of 
these ranchmen improved 19 percent above the 
previous drouth year, but still was 27 percent below 
the 1950 level. These ranchmen have been able to 
obtain the necessary credit for expansion and fi-
nancial recovery with the improved relationship 
between debt and assets which began in 1957. 
Nonoperating owners of ranch lands in the area 
studied were not materially hurt financially during 
the drouth years because of the income from leas-
ing for ranching and mineral purposes and because 
land values rose despite the drouth. Credit was no 
problem to this group. 
Full owner-operators were in much the same 
position as nonoperating owners except for heavy 
losses in their livestock operations. Those with 
good equities in their land easily could finance their 
livestock operations with real estate credit. Part 
owner-operators were in a more unfavorable in-
come and credit position depending on the pro-
portion of owned land to leased land and their 
equity in the owned acreage operated. 
Ranchmen who leased all of the land they 
operated were hurt badly by the drouth, with prob-
ably one-fourth going out of the ranching business. 
Many of the lease operators soon were placed in 
deficit net worth positions because they borrowed 
on their livestock to meet lease payments, to buy 
feed and to pay for other operating and living ex-
penses. Many operators exhausted all normal 
sources of credit and resorted to emergency credit 
to remain i.n business. Some lease operators, es-
pecially the smaller ones, remained in business by 
finding off-ranch employment. Credit was difficult 
for the full lease operators to obtain even after the 
drouth ended. 
Most ranch owners went into the drouth period 
with high equities in their real estate. The equities 
served as excellent reserves and provided the se-
curity .for much operating credit during the emer-
ge.ncy and recovery periods. Owner-operators 
shifted much of their accumulated short-term drouth 
credit to longer-term, lower-cost real estate credit. 
Delinquency in repaying real estate loans was not 
serious during the drouth. 
The credit requirements of ranchmen for op-
erating purposes may be expected to exceed the 
value of the available livestock collateral for many 
operators during long drouths. Declining livestock 
prices that coincided with the drouth hastened the 
unfavorable relationship betwee.n the amount of 
loan and collateral during the drouth of the 1950'~. 
This quickly added to the risk of both the 
borrower and the lender. The experience of 
indicates that they safely can continue to 
needed credit to good livestock operators 
drouth or adverse price conditions although 
of the loan may exceed the market value 
livestock. 
Commercial banks provided most of the 
ing credit to ranchmen during the drouth 
drouth years of the 1950's. The dollar 
credit to the operators increased about 
and the banks cooperated fully with the 
loan program when the loans reached the 
mum size for that bank. Banks generally 
to take care of their regular borrowers 
drouth years and for restocking purposes 
the drouth. Loans were based more on the 
ness of the ranchman's operation under 
ditions than on a strict security basis. 
Most banks serving the drouth areas 
to increase their deposits, capital accounts 
serves during the drouth years because of 
high nonranch business activity. These 
gether with the experience gained 
drouth, place the banks in a better position 
the credit needs of their ranchmen borrowers 
future emergencies. 
Special livestock 
through the Farmers 
valuable to hundreds of operators who 
might have been forced out of business 
drouth. Little if any loss will be sustained 
loans. Experience has proved that even 
high-risk loans will work out with time and 
ranch operations. 
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HARLEY BEBOUT, Associate Professor, 
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MOST SEVERE AND PROLONGED DROUTH in 
history extended from 1950-57. This 
true in many other sections of the 
States. 
entire State was a critical drouth area 
this period although the intensity of the 
varied in different sections. Rainfall, the 
limiting factor in agricultural produc-
ly varies widely in different areas of 
However, it ranged from 20 to 50 per-
normal at more than 20 recording sta-
as much as 80 percent below normal at 
tations in certain years of the drouth. 
seriousness of the drouth was recog-
early as 1953, when practically all Texas 
had been classified by the United States 
t of Agriculture as disaster counties 
of them receiving aid under the drouth 
EFFECTS OF THE DROUTH ON 
FARMERS AND RANCHMEN 
and ranchmen sustained heavy fi-
losses during the drouth years. Many 
who depended on rainfall to make a crop 
or greatly reduced incomes resulting in 
depletion of their financial assets. N eces-
......... " .. ,; .... '" for production outlays and living 
impaired their operating and investment 
Many farmers depending wholly on crop 
were forced to seek off-farm employ-
ve up farming. Ranchmen were forced 
. livestock or buy feed. Most ranch-
reduced the size of their herds 
and in many areas fed them all year. 
were forced to sell in years of low prices 
absorbing heavy feed bills and other oper-
expenses. Most ranchmen who depended 
on livestock, wool and mohair sales for 
borrowed heavily on their assets and in 
instances beyond the total value of their 
Ranchmen generally relied on the emer-
feed and transportation subsidies, when 
during the drouth. 
total farm cash income in Texas declined 
tely despite more than 6 years of 
averaged about the same as during 
uth period. However, a majority of 
f'n ....... "' .. " and ranchmen still suffered severe 
losses. Texas farmers and ranchmen 
probably lost 3 billion dollars in income as a re-
sult of the drouth. Cash farm income for the 
State declined only about 13 percent during 1951-
56. Further decline in incomes were offset dur-
ing the drouth years by the expansion of irriga-
tion and fairly stable prices for most products. 
The majority of farmers and ranchmen had rela-
tively low net cash income as compared with the 
predrouth years due to increased costs and low 
production in most of the State. In the vast 
ranching areas of Texas, most operators took 
heavy losses in their ranching operations. 
Remarkable recovery was made by farmers 
and ranchmen who survived the drouth, follow-
ing the end of the drouth in 1957. Farm and 
ranch income rose almost 30 percent between the 
drouth year low of 1956 and the end of 1959. 
While part of this increase was due to higher 
livestock prices, the principal reason was the 
above normal rainfall in most areas of the State 
during 1957-59. Favorable weather and grazing 
conditions brought rapid rebuilding of livestock 
herds. Farmers and ranchmen recovered part of 
their drouth losses and strengthened their fi-
nancial position and borrowing capacity neces-
sary to recovery. 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This study was made to develop information 
on the effects of drouth on the ranchman's finan-
cial condition and his drouth and postdrouth 
credit requirements to assist him with credit man-
agement problems during future drouths. 
Another major objective was to show how 
the lending operations of credit agencies are af-
fected by drouth conditions and to develop in-
formation useful to them in meeting credit needs 
and formulating credit policies in future drouth 
emergencies. 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Most of the information and credit data for 
this study were obtained from the Texas Produc-
tion Credit Association (TPAC), the San Angelo 
Federal Land Bank Association, the Farmers 
Home Administration office at San Angelo, The 
Ozona National Bank and the National Finance 
Credit Corporation (NFCC) of Fort Worth. 
These lending institutions provide much of 
the credit to ranchmen on the Edwards Plateau, 
which was a critical drouth area from 1950-57. 
3 
Ranches in this area are large, with sheep com-
prising 80 percent of the total livestock popula-
tion. 
Loan data supplied by the NFCC presents a 
broader picture of the ranch credit situation dur-
ing and following the drouth ~ince it ?perates. on 
a statewide basis with all of Its lendIng on lIve-
stock operations, mostly to cattlemen. 
Conclusions drawn from the analysis of the 
information obtained generally apply in all areas 
of the State. 
EFFECTS OF DROUTH ON FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES AND CREDIT POSITION 
OF RANCHMEN 
The changes which occurred in the financial 
and credit position of the typical ranch operator 
within the ten-county area served by the TPCA 
at San Angelo are shown by a summary of .the in-
dividual records obtained from 22 borrowIng op-
erators, Table l. 
These ranchmen were continuous borrowers 
from the TPCA and records were obtained for 
January 1, 1950, which show the finan~ial. posi-
tion of the average borrower at the begInnIng of 
the drouth. Records also were obtained for J an-
uary 1, 1957, revealing the financial position of 
this group of ranchmen near the end of the 
drouth. Records again were obtained for Janu-
ary 1, 1958, showing the imp!oved financial po-
sition of the group for the fIrst year after the 
drouth. January 1 is an approximate date since 
all borrowers do not make their annual financing 
arrangements on this date. Actually, renewals 
are spread over several months. 
The average size of the 22 ranches was 14,-
730 acres in 1950 and changed little during the 8-
year period. Only two of the ranchmen owned all 
of the land that they operated and twelve owned 
part of the land they operated. Eight of the 22 
did not own any land. The 22 ranchmen owned 
38 percent of the land that they operated and 
leased 62 percent. There was little change in the 
proportion owned or operated during the drouth 
period. The average cost of leases in 1950 was 
about 60 cents per acre with few reductions made 
during the drouth period. Operators wanted to 
keep their leases for the recovery years to come 
and many went in debt to do so. 
The 22 operators lost $1,146,041 
cent of their assets from 1950 until 
fore the drouth ended in 1957. 
assets were largely a result of a 
number of livestock, a decline in 
head of livestock and the loss of 
Liabilities in this period u· lcreiaM 
or 46 percent which reflect increased 
principally against a smaller number 
and against land to finance drouth 
losses. The total decrease in net 
end of the drouth was $1,636,877 for 
rowers and represented a loss of 38 
ing the 7 drouth years. 
Although land values continued 
ing this period, the rise was not 
financial statements of these 1J0r'r0\1f81 
loans usually are not based on 
and the reflected changes in 
credit position of the borrowers 
lated directly to the drouth. 
This group of borrowers u· .• "' .. " , ....... 
of their chattel loans 32 percent, 
tate mortgage loans 70 percent 
liabilities 68 percent during the 
The average total indebtedness per 
creased 46 percent. These increased 
ing the drouth resulted from l·Jl lcreasea 
of feed for livestock, lease 'Y\(":rT\"ll~nta 
terest on real estate loans and opE!ratUl 
ing expenses. The loan size in 
greater than the value of the 
borrowers' debts increased from 20 to 
of their assets during the drouth 
average ranchman in this group 
assets and increased his debts more 
during this period. 
During the first year of recovery 
in 1957, the assets of this same group 
ers increased $509,123 or 12 percent, 
ities decreased only $12,404 or less 
cent. Net worth during this 
$521,527 or 19 percent more than 
year. However, the net worth 
average ranchman was still 27 
1950 net worth, but his position 
higher than his lowest point during 
The remarkable increase in 
worth in this first year of recovery 
TABLE 1. FINANCIAL CONDITION OF 22 RANCH OPERATORS, JANUARY 1, 1950, 1957 AND 
Total Liabilities Net Date 
assets worth 
Chattel Land Other Total 
1-1-50 $5.402,892 $663,026 $282,487 $114,923 $1,060.436 $4,342.456 
1-1-57 4,256,851 878,783 479,986 192,503 1,551,272 2,705,579 - 21 +46 
1-1-58 4,765,974 868,263 473,645 196,960 1,538,868 3,227,106 +12 -.8 
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rood income from high production, some early 
restocking and higher prices for livestock. The 
average operator had paid off a considerable 
amount of his indebtedness by early 1958, but it 
was reborrowed for restocking purposes. This left 
his liability position practically unchanged but 
placed him in a good position for increasing his 
borrowings for more restocking during and af-
ter 1958. 
These data reflect the drastic changes which 
took place in the financial and credit position of 
this group of TPCA borrowers during this per-
iod. They were relatively large operators and 
were in good financial condition at the beginning 
of the drouth which enabled them to use many 
of their own resources and to obtain necessary 
credit to carry them through the drouth. 
About 10 percent of the ranchmen borrow-
ing from the TPCA voluntarily discontinued their 
operations during the drouth years. Most of 
these men could have continued their operations 
by going deeper in debt but were unwilling to as-
smne the added risk and the possibility of having 
to use emergency credit. The association did not 
force any of its borrowers into liquidation and 
eontinued to supply the needed credit during and 
following the critical years. 
FECTS OF DROUTH ON INCOME, FINAN-
CIAL AND CREDIT POSITION OF 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
RANCH OPERATORS 
The effects of the drouth on the income, fi-
lI&Dcial and credit position of ranchmen depend-
largely on their position as owners, owner-op-
«ators or lease operators. 
The owners of ranch lands in the San Angelo 
area that were not operating for themselves were 
lOt materially hurt financially by the drouth. 
The owners generally received a cash lease in-
tome of 50 cents to $1 per acre from lease oper-
ators who could payor borrow on their livestock 
to meet the obligation because they did not want 
to lose their leases. Leases· generally did not de-
cline in price during the drouth, and few lease 
adjustments were made. 
Most of the owners in this area received min-
eral lease income of around $1 per acre in addi-
tion to the regular ranch lease income. Some re-
t.eived :ncome from oil and gas production. 
Land values in this area continued to rise 
pite the drouth and with these increasing 
equities, credit generally was obtained easily by 
ranch landowners. 
Full owner-operators were in much the same 
position as nonoperating owners with respect to 
noperating income; however, they lost heavily 
their livestock operations because of heavy 
lays for feed and operating expenses. This 
up of ranchmen, as a w hole, were able to 
maintain their net worth position. Those with 
larger equities in their land easily could finance 
their operating losses with real estate credit. 
Part owner-operators were in a more unfavorable 
income and credit position than full owners, de-
pending upon the proportion of acres owned to 
acres leased and their equity in the owned acre-
age operated. 
The ranchmen leasing all of the land that 
they operated were badly hurt as a result of the 
drouth. Year after year they received little feed 
returns from their leased lands and were forced 
to sell much of their livestock and to buy feed 
to retain their remaining livestock. In addition, 
they had to pay for their leases. These operators 
had no income from minerals and could not par-
ticipate in the rise in land value. Many were 
forced to borrow on their remaining livestock to 
the extent that they reached a deficit net worth 
position and exhausted all normal credit sources. 
Emergency credit was the only alternative. Re-
liable estimates show that one-fourth of the lease 
operators gave up ranching during the drouth 
period. 
REAL ESTATE EQUITIES AS SECURITY FOR 
FINANCING DURING DROUTH AND 
RECOVERY 
A study of the real estate credit extended 
by the Federal Land Bank in the five-county area 
served by the San Angelo Federal Land Bank 
Association reveals the increased use of real es-
tate equities as security for financing farm and 
ranch operations during the drouth, Table 2. 
Most of the farmers and ranchmen went into the 
drouth with high equities in their land which 
served as reserves when needed for the drouth 
and postdrouth years. 
The area served by the San Angelo Federal 
Land Bank Association, essentially a ranch coun-
try in total acres, had a greater number of farms. 
The large number of loans made by this real es-
tate credit agency were farm loans that account-
ed for the relatively smaller sized average loan. 
However, the greater dollar volume of the total 
lending was made to the ranchmen borrowers who 
comprised less than one-third in number but bor-
rowed over one-half of the total amount loaned. 
These ranch borrowers represented, on an a ver-
age, a cross section of the smaller operators. 
From January 1, 1951 to January 1, 1958, 
the total number of loans outstanding increased 
approximately 23 percent while the amount out-
standing increased approximately 152 percent. 
This increase is attributed mainly to increased 
credit needs to meet drouth conditions rather 
than to finance land purchases or for other pur-
poses. The total loan volume has continued to 
increase since the drouth ended in 1957 because 
of the continued need to refinance real estate and 
to obtain more capital for operating purposes. 
Optimism following the drouth also added to the 
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amount loaned for land purchase and improve-
ment purposes. 
Further analysis of the loans made during 
this period shows that 45 percent of the amount 
loaned was for operating purposes, 37 percent for 
refinancing, 13 percent for land purchase and 5 
percent for improvements. The large amount 
loaned for operating purposes through 195'6 was 
for carrying livestock and to pay short-term 
debts accumulated during the drouth. The les-
ser amount loaned for operating purposes was 
mostly for restocking ranches during 1957-58. A 
relatively large amount of money was loaned for 
refinancing when new borrowers refinanced and 
increased the size of their land loans to obtain 
operating capital on real estate security at a low-
er rate. Refinancing of land on a longer term 
basis was made necessary by the drouth. 
Thirteen percent of the total amount loaned 
for land purchase was borrowed mostly by owner-
operators for enlargement of their farms and 
ranches. Few entered the farming and ranch-
ing business during the drouth period. The 
small percentage loaned for improvement pur-
poses during the 7-year period reflects good 
judgment on the part of borrowers in using their 
real estate equities for necessary operating credit 
needs. Borrowing for improvement purposes has 
increased during the postdrouth years. 
The number of loans and the amount of the 
accumulated interest and amortization delinquen-
cy on the loans, while above normal, was not ser-
ious in any of the drouth years, Table 2. In 
relation to the number of loans and the dollar 
volume outstanding this is a remarkable record 
of repayment by borrowers whose incomes were 
reduced drastically by the drouth. Loan repay-
ment deliquency was not a serious problem to 
the association which continued to supply farm-
ers and ranchmen with needed credit during the 
drouth and subsequent years. 
CREDIT REQUIREMENTS IN REL 
LIVESTOCK COLLATERAL D 
DROUTH AND POSTDROUTH 
PERIODS 
The loan information that the 
vided for this study presents an excellent 
of the effects the drouth had on the 
ranchman borrower's credit requir 
lation to the value of the available Ii 
lateral. It a.lso shows the ability and 
of the lender to continue financing many 
ranchmen borrowers even after the 
their loans exceeded the value of their 
Table 3. 
During the dl'outh years, the loan 
on cattle increased 80 percent, sheep, 44 
and on goats, 183 percent. The value of 
stock on which these loans were based 
after 1952 until the end of the drouth, 
the risk of the ranchman borrower 
der. This risk is shown even more 
ing 1951-57 when the average size loan 
while the average value of the colla 
rower decreased. The average percent 
the livestock collateral increased from 42 
to 103 percent. 
The progressive increase in the loan 
and in the average size loan per hlY!'· ... l\'"O .. 
most of the drouth years was caused 
by heavy borrowing for purchasing feed 
loss or sale of collateral during the drouth 
The improvement in livestock prices 
income and the credit position of most 
who survived the drouth quickly reversed 
when the drouth ended. The loan per 
mained at about the same level as d 
latter drouth years and the average loan 
creased. This was due to increased 
penditures including large sums for 
and higher operating costs. The 
TABLE 2. TOTAL NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF LOANS OUTSTANDING, NUMBER AND TOTAL AMOUNT OF LOANS 
DURING YEAR. PURPOSE AND AMOUNT OF LOANS MADE DURING YEAR. NUMBER OF LOANS AND AMOUNT 
QUENT. DROUTH AND POSTDROUTH PERIOD. 1951-59. SAN ANGELO FEDERAL LAND BANK ASSOCIATION 
Total Total Number 
number Amount Number amount Purpose and amount of loans loans loans outstand- loans loans made during year delin-Date outstand- ing at made made quent at ing at beginning during during begin-beginning of year year Refi- Improve- Oper- Land pur- ning of 
of year year nancing ments ating chasing year 
No. Dollars No. ---------~~--------- No. 
1-1-51 265 996.000 28 178.500 104.600 11.800 11.300 50.800 7 
I-I-52 266 1.054.000 44 498.800 217.100 13.400 226.800 41.500 11 
1-1-53 270 1.351.000 42 434.700 155.500 8.000 203.500 67.700 25 
1-1-54 276 1.563.000 38 367.800 80.500 18.200 184.900 84.200 22 
1-1-55 277 1.751.000 53 586.100 176.800 36.200 335.300 37.800 16 
1-1-56 302 2.053.000 55 596.600 242.500 18.200 286.400 49.500 16 
1-1-57 326 2.385.000 27 363.700 174.800 24.300 128.300 36.300 23 
1-1-58 325 2.507.000 44 414.300 133.200 37.500 149.700 93.900 12 
1-1-59 338 2.714.000 35 360.500 74.200 29.800 119.900 136.600 7 
7-1-59 362 3.000.000 (est.) 13 
S 
BILE 3. APPRAISED VALUE PER HEAD OF LIVESTOCK, AMOUNT LOANED PER HEAD, AVERAGE LOAN PER BORROW. 
VALUE OF AVERAGE COLLATERAL PER BORROWER AND AVERAGE PERCENT LOANED ON COLLATERAL, DROUTH 
AND POSTDROUTH PERIOD, 1950-1959, NATIONAL FINANCE CREDIT CORPORATION 
Cattle Sheep Goats Average Average Average value 
Date Value Loan Value Loan Value Loan loan per collateral percent loaned on per per per per per per borrower per 
collateral head head head head head head borrower 
---------------D~~--------------- Percent 
1-1-50 120.59 58.85 16.40 8.00 
1-1-51 147.70 62.70 19.62 8.33 
1-1-52 186.79 79.52 23.72 10.10 
1·1-53 157.18 84.50 15.77 8.48 
1·1-54 120.07 100.45 13.69 11.45 
1·1-55 109.17 98.04 13.45 12.08 
11-56 110.93 110.07 13.71 13.60 
1·1-57 103.35 106.37 11.23 11.56 
1-1-58 108.00 96.26 15.46 13.78 
1·1-59 143.60 105.41 18.61 13.66 
credit position was much improved with re-
stocked ranches and the rise in the value of his 
eollateral. The average perc~nt loaned on collat-
eral had declined 73 percent by 1959 and 59 per-
cent by mid-1959. 
The number of loans and total dollar volume 
loans carried by this company declined slight-
from 1952-57. Since 1957, both are more than 
outh levels. Some of its borrowers shifted 
ir debt to lower cost land loans before 1957, 
'fhile some used participating emergency FHA 
uth loans. A few ranchmen sold land and cut 
size of their operations. The liberal lending 
Hey of this agency during the drouth em erg-
and the decline in livestock values is shown 
the high percentage loans which it made. Len-
probably can safely continue with good live-
k operators during drouth emergencies, even 
en their loans exceed 100 percent. 
MMERCIAL BANKS SERVE RANCHMEN 
LL DURING DROUTH AND RECOVERY 
Commercial banks which previously supplied 
t of the operating credit to ranchmen contin-
to do so during the drouth and postdrouth 
·ods. Bank credit to ranchmen increased by 
re than one-third even in the areas where the 
uth was most severe during 1950-57. Bankers 
erally accepted their responsibility to these 
owers by making excess loans as long as 
'ng regulations permitted. They also ar-
ed loans with outside credit agencies and 
icipated in them to keep their customers in 
iness. Ranchmen who wanted to continue op-
tions generally could secure the necessary 
it, if the repayment capacity looked favorable 
en normal conditions returned. Many ranch-
, mostly lease operators, voluntarily liqui-
d and some salvaged part of their assets, but 
were forced to liquidate in the ranching areas 
ered by this study. 
Ranchmen and their bankers again became 
. istic when the drouth ended in 1957. While 
5.04 2.46 51,742.10 106,050.92 48.80 
7.68 3.26 48,688.38 114,688.65 42.45 
9.71 4.13 57,380.60 134,780.84 42.57 
7.20 3.87 56,030.13 104,221.91 53.76 
6.48 5.42 72,576.32 86,750.28 83.66 
6.67 6.10 78.495.83 87.408.00 89.80 
6.78 6.72 83,314.40 83,965.75 99.22 
6.73 6.97 71,705.80 69,672.63 102.92 
8.13 7.24 77.422.58 86,856.66 89.14 
7.79 5.72 87,021.71 118,551.61 73.40 
the equities of borrowers were reduced greatly 
through the sale of livestock and heavy borrow-
ing on the livestock was retained, additional 
credit demands for restocking purposes immedi-
a tely arose. 
The banks serving the ranching areas, al-
though already carrying excessive ranch loans, 
were in a stronger position to supply the finan-
cial requirements for restocking than they were 
before the drouth. Deposits in drouth area banks 
increased about 25 percent during the drouth 
years due to nonranch business activity. Banks 
generally were able to increase their capital ac-
counts and reserves. These factors made it · pos-
sible for the banks to supply most of the needed 
postdrouth credit for rebuilding livestock herds. 
The factors affecting the financial needs of 
ranchmen during the drouth are substantiated . 
by information from the Ozona National Bank. 
There was only a small decline in the number of 
ranch loans carried by the bank during the drouth 
and postdrouth years, 1950-59. This shows that 
the bank was able and willing to provide the need-
ed credit to most of their ranchmen customers. 
Only about half of the bank's ranch borrow-
ers were continuous borrowers during this period 
because in some years outside sources of income 
made it unnecessary to borrow for feed and other 
operating and living expenses. Also a few, most-
ly ranch owners, were in and out of livestock op-
erations. Seventy percent of the ranchmen bor-
rowers at this bank own most of the land that 
they operate, but the bank had to take real estate 
security in only a few cases. 
Dollar loan volume to ranchmen during the 
drouth increased about 10 percent with an addi-
tional 10-percent increase for restocking purposes 
dUring the 1957-59 recovery years. 
Out of 120 ranchmen borrowers at this bank, 
22 had received emergency loans from the FHA 
on a participating basis with the bank. By 1959, 
eight of these had paid off their FHA loans in 
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full, and the bank again was supplying all of their 
credit requirements. The remaining 14 FHA bor-
rowers had reduced appreciably their debt to both 
the FHA and the bank. Several more expected 
to repay the FHA in full in 1960 and with good 
range conditions continuing, all of these borrow-
ers again would become 100 percent bank borrow-
ers. 
SPECIAL LIVESTOCK LOANS 
Special livestock loans made available to 
ranchmen through the FHA were valuable to 
hundreds of operators who otherwise might have 
been forced or elected to go out of business dur-
ing the drouth. The ranchmen who were unable 
to obtain the necessary credit to continue opera-
tion from normal credit sources and who had suc-
cessful past records of livestock operations were 
eligible for special livestock loans. These loans 
were not made for expansion or to pay existing 
debts. Most of them were made to ranchmen 
who had existing loans with banks or other lend-
ing agencies that did not have to subordinate 
their liens to FHA. 
The banks and other lending agencies which 
participated with FHA and thus enabled custo-
mers to continue ranching through the drouth 
were rewarded because they did not have to sus-
tain losses that liquidation could have caused. 
They retained most of their regular customers by 
doing this. Some ranchmen's total credit needs 
went beyond the lending limits of their banks so 
the additional credit supplied by special livestock 
loans was helpful in enabling the banks to keep 
good loans during the drouth. 
In seven of the counties served by the San 
Angelo FHA office, 93 special livestock loans 
were made. Most of these loans were made in 
1953 shortly after authority was granted for 
making them. A few were made in the latter 
years of the drouth until authority for making 
new loans expired in 1957. Additional advances 
were made on most of these loans during the 
drouth years. 
By the middle of 1957, $4,638,222 had been 
advanced to these 93 ranchmen for an average 
of $49,873 per ranch. Relatively little repayment 
was made on the loans until the drouth ended in 
1957. These 93 ranchmen had repaid $3,877,415 
or 83.6 percent of the amount borrowed by July 
1959. Fifty-one borrowers had repaid their loans 
in full to the FHA. Of the 51 borrowers who had 
repaid in full, 10 had voluntarily elected to liqui-
date by selling their livestock before 1959. The 
remaining 41 fully paid FHA borrowers had im-
proved their financial position sufficiently to ob-
tain all credit needs from their banks. Of the 
remaining 42 FHA borrowers, 38 had reduced 
the size of their loans to both the FHA and to 
their banks. They expected to completely repay 
their FHA loans within 2 to 3 years and go back 
to their banks for all future credit needs. Only 
8 
four of the 93 special livestock loans 
classified as doubtful in 1959. 
had sold all of their livestock with 
balance remaining. In the final 
will be little if any loss on the 
loans made in this area. Although 
extremely high risk loans, experience 
they will work out with time and 
erators. 
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR 
AND BORROWERS 
Credit agencies serving r 
risk drouth areas should be aware 
is likely to occur at any time, that 
cannot be predicted and that they 
carry heavier credit burdens during 
gency periods and even for short 
ing drouths. 
The loan size generally will 
many cases credit requirements 
value of the available collateral 
livestock herd liquidation. 
will be slow and delinquencJT high, 
requiring renewal and with the 
date uncertain. These factors, in 
risk of lenders, may justify the 
interest rates existing in these areas. 
Lenders should be prepared to 
directly or indirectly the credit 
many years as the drouth may last 
justing back to normal operations 
drouth periods. 
Drouth loans should be made 
of integrity, management ability 
payment prospects, with less 
value of present collateral. 
Lenders may prepare to meet 
demands by increasing their capital 
during normal periods, allowing for 
heavier risk loans. They may make 
rangements with other institutions 
ticipation in cases of excess loans or 
funds. 
Some banks might consider 
arate corporation for handling 
the discounting method. This 
used if there is a temporary 
funds or if good loans exceed the 
limits. 
While current credit sources are 
nance any likely future drouth 
ernment lending programs again 
necessary with which present, pri 
erative lending agencies will need to 
Ranchmen, _ when borrowing, 
a credit agency that is historically 
type of enterprise being financed. 
Adequate capital is necessary for 
ranch operation and the borrower 
to a unit of profitable size as quickly as possible 
to be prepared for drouth emergencies. This will 
require the selection of a credit agency which is 
capable and willing to supply the necessary 
amount of borrowed capital, as needed. 
The selection of a credit agency whose fi-
nancial structure and history show it to be capa-
ble and willing to stay with them in bad times 
as well as in good is important to a borrower. 
While interest rates and other credit costs should 
be considered by borrowers, these are not as im-
portant as complete credit services and other con-
siderations. Borrowers should recognize that 
credit costs generally are competitive and should 
be commensurate with risks. 
Financial management, as well as good ranch 
management, is essential to the ranchman in pre-
paring for drouth years. Ranchmen should build 
reserves in good years for use in bad years by 
building, as rapidly as possible, high equites in 
their short term higher risk loans on livestock. 
H possible, they should have some cash or near 
cash reserves in readily available investments. 
Ranch landowners may build reserves by making 
advance payments on their real estate loans dur-
ing good income years. 
Good financial management includes making 
full credit arrangements in advance of need, ar-
ranging to receive loan proceeds in the amount 
and on the date needed and applying proceeds of 
sales immediately to the repayment of the loan. 
When possible, lower cost real estate credit should 
be used to secure operating capital for longer use, 
such as restocking. These practices will reduce 
total credit cost. 
Credit should be used primarily for produc-
tion purposes with conservative credit use for 
unnecessary expenditures until a safe equity po-
sition is attained. Speculation should be avoided 
unless reserves are adequate to cover losses. 
Ranchmen will find it advantageous to ob-
tain all of their operating credit needs from one 
lending agency. This provides the best use of 
collateral since split lines of credit generally are 
unsatisfactory to lenders as well as to borrowers. 
Borrowers should work closely with their lending 
agencies, keeping them fully informed of their 
plans and future credit needs. 
Small ranch operators may consider some 
diversification or off-ranch employment to sup-
plement income and lessen their credit needs dur-
ing drouth emergencies. 
If using an emergency credit agency becomes 
necessary, the borrower should work with the 
first credit supplier as well as the new, with the 
idea of returning to the former as quickly as pos-
sible. 
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